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RECENT DECISIONS
that the sale of a trading partnership interest was the sale of a capital asset,
the Commissioner frequently petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari in
order to get a final adjudication on the subject. Certiorari was denied each
time. This consistent refusal has been construed to signify that the Supreme
Court refuses to disturb the lower court decisions. See United States v.
Shapiro, 178 F. 2d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1949). The refusal of the Court to grant
certiorari in the Swiren case could also be viewed in the same light which ,if
true, means that the Supreme Court sees no distinction between trading part-
nerships and professional partnerships. But see M r. Justice Frankfurter's strong
statement that denial of certiorari implies no approval of lower court decisions,
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S.9 12, 917-920 (1950).
Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue- may continue to attack the
sale of interests in professional partnerships, the form of the transaction may
be important. Care should be taken so that all facts point to the sale of an
interest, rather than to a termination of the partnership.
Henry Woicicki
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DEVISE OF FOREIGN REALTY -
RENVOI EXPRESSLY ADOPTED
Testator, a naturalized American citizen, died while domiciled in New
York, leaving real property in his native-Switzerland. His devise of this prop-
erty was valid by New York internal law, but invalid in part by Swiss internal
law, because of compulsory heirship in near relatives. The realty was sold
and proceeds transmitted to New York. Held: The devise is valid. Decedent
Estate Law § 47, in referring the question of validity of a devise to the law of
situs, means all of that law, including its principles of conflict of laws. Swiss
conflict law would in this case refer validity to the internal law of decedent's
nationality. The proceeds are to be distributed as the realty would have been,
i.e. by New York internal law. In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 652, on
reargument, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
'When a forum has decided that some aspect of the case should be dealt
with in view of the law of a particular foreign jurisdiction, it may refer to the
purely internal, domestic law of that jurisdiction; or, in the interest of uni-
formity of decision, i.e. to reach the same resultwhich other courts, including
the foreign court, would reach, it may refer to all of the law of the foreign
jurisdiction, incuding its principles of conflict of laws. If it makes the broader
reference, it adopts the so-called "renvoi" theory.
Renvoi has not suffered for lack of interest on the part of legal writers.
Those who oppose it focus their arguments upon the difficulty which may be
encountered in ascertaining a foreign conflict rule, and upon the possibility
that these problems are more theoretical than real, and that, in any event, the
to the conflict rule of some other jurisdiction which in turn refers to the conflict
rule of the forum, with supposedly endless reference and re-reference. See,
e.g., Cormack, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the
49
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Conflict of Laws, 14 So. CAL. L. REV. 221 (1941). Those who favor it answer
that these problems are more theoretical than real, and that, in any event, the
practical desirability of securing uniform treatment irrespective of the forum
chosen-the purpose of conflict rules-should not be sacrified merely because
in some cases, utilization of renvoi does not provide a complete answer: E.g.
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1938); see also RABEL,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 70-83 (1945). The RESTATE-
MIENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, under the influence of the late Professor Beale,
one of renvoi's more vigorous opponents, rejects the doctrine, except in the de-
termination of title to land and validity of divorce (§8), both of which excep-
tion have been accepted by most writers. Apparently, it is all right to overlook
logical difficulties in order to protect traditionally superior interests.
Judicial attitudes, also, have varied. Many Continental and English au-
thorities recognize renvoi and apply it as a general proposition. Forg-Dicth
Heirs v. Tax Adm'n, Court of Cassation, Clunet (1883) 64 (Forgo case); In
re Ross, [1830] 1 Ch. Div. 377; In re Annisley, [1926] Ch. 692. American and
Canadian authorities, for the most part, have not met the problem squarely,
e.g., Listerv. McAnulty, [1944] 2 D L. R. 673 -(Can. Sup. Ct., 1944). When
they have, the result has been rejection, Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H. 82, 174 A. 508
(1934), or acceptance without discussion of the doctrine or its merits, Uni-
versity of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N. W. 175 (1936); Guernsey
v. Imperial Bank of Canada, 188 Fed. 300 (8th Cir. 1911).
In New York, there are decisions endorsing the renvoi approach; and
there are decisions condemning it. In a case involving testamentary disposition
of personalty, it was asserted that "renvoi is no part of New York law." In
re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1919). See also
Lann v. United Steel Works, 166 Misc. 465, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 951 (1938). But the
court overlooked a case employing the renvoi approach in construing the New
York borrowing statute (Code of Civil Procedure, § 390-a, now Civ. Prac. Act,
§ 13), concerning time limitations on imported causes of action, Holmes v.
Hengen, 41 Misc. 521, 85 N. Y. Supp. 35, aff'd, 94 App..Div. 619, 88 N. Y.
Supp. 1104 (Ist Dep't 1904), and disregarded a dictum concerning testamen-
tary disposition of personalty in Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556 (1873). Sub-
sequently, the Court of Appeals reached the renvoi result in two cases in-
volving validity of foreign divorces. Ball v. Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E.
106 (1921) and Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (1925). The in-
stant case is the first, however, to accept renvoi by name. But see AMason v.
Rose, 176 F. 2d 486 (2d Cir. 1949).
The significance of this decision can be discounted by those who doubt
the workability of renvoi, since factually at least, it is within one of the two
exceptions which all writers apparently recognize. But such a limitation upon
its rationale plainly is not intended. Surrogate Frankenthaler makes it clear
RECENT DECISIONS
that he views the renvoi approach as possessing a definite utility in the solution
of problems other than that of succession to land. Its application, he believes,
should be the rule and not the exception. ,A New York court should dispose of
the case as if it were a court of the jurisdiction to whose law it refers. 100
N. Y. S. 2d 371, 373. See Griswold, op. cit. supra at 1182. No precise limi-
tations upon this approach are expressed in'the opinion, but there is a sug-
gestion that foreign internal law should be adopted only when "underlying
policies of our law" require it. Civil Practice Act S 13, insofar as it deals
with the tolling of statutes of limitation as to causes of action arising in enemy
territory during wartime, may well embody such a policy. See Apton v. Bar-
clay's Bank, Ltd., 91 N. Y. S. 2d 589, aff'd, 276 App. Div. 910, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 1
(2d Dep't 1950). It seems necessary to make another observation, viz., that
parties entering into a contract, when permitted to choose the law of a par-
ticular jurisdiction to determine their rights and obligations, would normally
intend the internal, domestic law of thatr jurisdiction and not its principles
of conflict of laws. Note, 40 COL. L. REv. 518, 523 (1940); cf. Vita Food
Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A. C. 277. In addition, there is
room for the more basic argument that some of the forum's rules of reference
may be founded upon considerations such that.a reference to internal law alone
is intended; for example, in determining the validity of the terms of a contract,
those jurisdictions which refer to the law of the place of rhaking may regard
the parties as having contracted with reference only to its internal law.
It is to be noted that, in the instant case, the foreign conflict rule referred
to the internal law of the forum, so the problem of continuous reference and
re-reference did not arise. If this were always true, there would be little left
of the argument against renvoi. It is the possibility that. the foreign conflict
rule may refer to the conflict rule of the forum, together with a mechanical
notion of renvoi, which has led many writers to reject it as impracticable.
Other writers have attempted to explain away the difficulties engendered by
such an approach, but have realized little success. E.g. Cowan, Renvoi Does
Not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. oF PA. L. REV. 34 (1938); Griswold, In
Reply to Mr. Cowan's Views on Renvoi, 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 257 (1939). See
Rabel, op. cit. supra at 78. Without adding to those attempts, it may be ob-
served that the controvresy stems principally from a difference in emphasis.
Those who reject renvoi demand an approach which provides a complete and
easy solution in all cases. Its questionable validity does not seem to trouble
them. The others are content with a solution, though somewhat asymetrical,
if it produces substantial similarity of decision in the particular case irrespec-
tive of the forum chosen. The instant decision proceeds upon the latter theory
and leaves problems of continuous reference to be decided when and if they
arise. It would seem that if, as the renvoi approach receives more widespread
recognition, it becomes necessary to stop the references somewhat arbitrarily,
resort may be had to the point (i.e. the first reference) required by those
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who reject renvoi, or, for that matter, to some other point equally arbitrary.
But given the renvoi approach-which comes nearest to reaching the objective
established for conflict principles-there is good reason to advocate the adop-
tion, by interstate and international agreements, of rules defining the point at
which the reference may in each particular situation most appropriately be
stopped. See Knauth, Renvoi, etc. in Transportation Law, 49 COL. L. REV.
1 (1949).
Philip A. Erickson
HUSBAND AND WIFE - RECOVERY BY WIFE FOR LOSS
OF CONSORTIUM
Plaintiff's husband, while in defendant's employ, suffered severe and per-
manent injuries to his body. As a result, plaintiff alleged that she had been
deprived of her husband's aid, assistance and conjugal enjoyment. The hus-
band collected an award under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act, the applicable workmen's compensation law for the District
of Columbia. The "exclusive liability" section of the act, 44 Stat. 426, 33 U. S.
C. A. § 905, provides that the liability under the act "shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of the employer to the employee ... husband or wife
... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer...
on account of such injury or death." Held: a wife has a cause of action for loss
of consortium resulting from a negligent injury to her husband. Also, the
"exclusive liability" section of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act is not a bar to her action, because: (I) her right is independent,
and (2) the section is aimed at, and only bars, derivative suits. Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co. 183 F. 2d 811 (1950); cert. denied, 340 U. S. 852, 71 Sup. Ct.
80 (1950).
Case authority against the proposition that a wife has a cause of action
for loss of consortium occasioned by the negligent injury of her husband is
uniform throughout the nation. Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Homes, 250
Ala. 295, 34 So. 2d 203 (1948); Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185
N. E. 86 (1933) ; Feneff v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436
(1909); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N. Y. Supp. 534 (2d
Dept. 1934); Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1900);
Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462, 13 A. L. R. 1320 (1909); and
other cases cited 59 A. L. R. 680 (1929).
Various reasons have been assigned for denying the wife this right. Some
cases rule that since the wife is not entitled to her husband's services, she has
no cause of action, because "material services" is the only compensable ele-
ment of consortium. Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, supra. Some courts, with this
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